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Chapter 8 
Same Sex Immigration: Domestication and Homonormativity 
NANSEUFFERT 
INTRODUCTION 
Law and policy-makers in New Zealand have taken what might be seen, from a 
conservativetliberal divide, as two contradictory stances on aspects of border control 
over the past decade. In one move they have progressively tightened and whitened 
immigration policy generally, making the process for gaining residency in the country 
more restrictive. On the other hand, they have progressively opened the borders in 
relation to the immigration of same sex couples, aligning immigration requirements 
for these couples with those of heterosexual couples. I argue that New Zealand's 
recent liberalisation of immigration law and policy for gays and lesbians aligns with, 
rather than contradicts, notions of neo-liberal politics, progressive modernity and the 
current tightening and whitening of immigration. Same sex couples who most easily 
fit the immigration criteria will be those from developed 'Western' democracies that 
also tolerate and recognise same sex relationships according to an assimilative 
model, and who live together in long term stable, monogamous, property owning 
relationships sharing domestic chores. These criteria mean that immigration of same 
sex couples is likely to favour properly homonormatised' lesbians and gay men, who 
' Duggan, L. 'The new homonormativity: the sexual politics of neo-liberalism' in R Castronovo 
8, DD Nelson (eds), Materializing Democracy: Toward a Revitalized Cultural Politics (Durham. 
Duke University Press, 2002) at 175-194. 
are white, middle class and part of the 'new neo-liberal sexual politics' of a 
domesticated, depoliticised, privatised gay constituen~y.~ 
HOMONORMATIVITY, NATION AND DOMESTICATION 
In recent decades 'queer theory' has arisen from critiques of 'heter~normativity',~ or 
the assumption that humans are divided into the categories of 'man' and 'woman', 
that these two categories represent opposite sexes that are natural and biological, 
that certain masculine and feminine traits, characteristics and actions flow from the 
fact of each biological sex, and that it is normal for the two sexes to enter into 
heterosexual intimate relationships. Disrupting and displacing heteronormativity has 
required recognising the biological diversity of bodies and the existence of culturally 
marginal sexual identifications, including lesbian, gay, transgender, transsexual, 
bisexual, intersex, crossdresser and others. In part in resistance to the historically 
fixed and entrenched categories of sex and sexuality, these identifications tend to be 
more fluid; some people identify only as 'queer', while others refuse any specific 
identification. Queer theory, which itself resists categorisation, might be seen as 
'resistance to regimes of the norma~.'~ It radically challenges the use of fixed, reified 
categories, assumptions about what is natural and normal, and hierarchies of sexual 
identification. Indeed, it has been said that to categorise it as a school of thought 'is 
to risk domesticating it, and to fixing it in ways that queer theory resists fixing itself." 
I will return to the idea of domestication. 
The term 'homonormativity' has been coined by Lisa Duggan to represent the 
normalisation of particular types of intimate homosexual relationships that reflect 
social hierarchies, including race, gender, class and other configurations of privi~ege.~ 
Duggan argues that a gay politics has emerged in the United States that positions 
/bid, at 179. 
Warner, M, 'Introduction: Fear of a Queer Planet' (1991) 29 Social Text 3. 
/bid, at 16. 
5 Jagose, A, Queer Theory (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 1996) at 2. 
Duggan, n 1, at 175-176. 
itself as mainstream, between the 'extremists' on the far left and the far right.' This 
gay politics seeks only formal equality rights.' It focuses on gay marriage and 
access to the military, embracing the idea that sexuality beyond formal marriage is a 
private matter. Duggan argues that the focus on the privatisation of lesbian and gay 
relationships of this politics embraces neoliberal economic policy, with its pro- 
business calls for downsizing government with the privatisation of many goods and 
services, in favour of the self-regulation of 'free  market^'.^ It is a: 
[Plolitics that does not contest dominant heteronormative assumptions and 
institutions but upholds and sustains them while promising the possibility of a 
demobilized gay constituency and a privatized, depoliticized gay culture 
anchored in domesticity and cons~mpt ion.~~ 
Duggan is careful to acknowledge that her identification of homonormativity does not 
create a category that parallels and reflects heteronormativity, as there are no gay 
structures parallel to those supporting and sustaining heterosexuality: her project is 
the identification and naming of an emerging politics in order that it may be analysed 
and critiqued." 
While Duggan's analysis is specifically centred in the United States, similar 
ideas have emerged elsewhere. In Canada it has been argued that in the written and 
oral submissions on the legislation to expand rights of same-sex partners and to 
allow same sex marriage 'feminist voices are marginalised' and 'conservative and 
heteronormative discourses on marriage and family are reinforced.'l2 An analysis of 
legal submissions made as part of the fight for same sex marriage in Canada 
' ibid, at 175-176. 
' Davies, M. Asking the Law Question (Sydney, Law Book Co. 1994) at 179-82. 
9 Duggan, n l ,  at 177-79. 
l0 ibid, at 179. 
" Ibid, fn 9 at 191. 
l2 Young, CL and Boyd, SE, 'Losing the Feminist Voice? Debates on the Legal Recognition of 
Same Sex Partnerships in Canada' (2006) 14 Feminist Legal Studies 213 at 214. 
demonstrates that they are predicated on the normalisation of whiteness in the gay 
subject, masking racial privilege.l3 In South Africa it has been argued that lesbian 
and gay politics that ignore the ways in which class, race and gender intersect with 
sexuality tend to reproduce rather than redress these hierarchies, producing a 
homonormativity in the process.14 To the extent that homonormativity is about 
reproducing and rewriting race and gender hierarchy in gay rights claims and 
struggles, these analyses suggest that homonormativity may be emerging in 
particularly local forms elsewhere. What is important, in my view, is destabilising the 
progressive narrative of the modern liberal state in achieving 'gay' rights,15 making 
visible the ways in which 'gay' is raced, classed and gendered, and highlighting the 
limitations of the rights. 
The idea of homonormativity has been extended to homo-nationalism in an 
analysis of the nation as producing collusion between homosexuality and American 
nationalism; attention to race-sexuality reveals the 'idealization of the US as a 
properly multicultural heteronormative but nevertheless gay friendly, tolerant, and 
sexually liberated so~iety."~ The argument is that the images and rhetoric that 
emerged post September 11 encompassed a reinvigoration of white, heterosexual 
norms through contrast with portrayals of terrorists as effeminate, emasculated, and 
'perversely racia~ized."~ At the same time a progressive sexuality was championed 
as a 'hallmark of US modernity."' ~r ibutes to 'gay heros' contrasted with the 
Taliban's treatment of Afghani women, and emphasis on the safety of the US for 
13 Lenon, SJ, 'Marlying Citizens1 Raced Subjects1 Re-thinking the Terrain of Equal Marriage 
Discourse' (2005) 17 Canadian journal of Women and Law 405 at 408. 
l4 Oswin, N, 'Producing Homonormativity in Neoliberal South Africa: Recognition, 
Redistribution and the Equality Project' (2007) 32 Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and 
Society 650 at 666. 
15 Eaton, M. 'Lesbians, Gays and the Struggle for Equality Rights: Reversing the Progressive 
Hypothesis' (1994) 17 Dalhousie Law Journal 130 at 133 (critically analysing the idea of law's 
steady progress from repression to enlightenment). 
Puar, JK, 'Mapping US Homonormativities' (Feb 2006) 13 Gender, Place and Culture 67 at 
68. 
l7 lbid, at 67. 
" Ibid. at 69-70. 
gays compared favourably to the 'Middle East."' These dynamics produced images 
of gays and lesbians acceptable within the nation, as part of a patriotic nationality. 
Rather than a strict heterosexuallhomosexual divide, gays and lesbians would be 
divided through more complex images, raced, gendered, classed and aligned with 
nationalism, into those who were acceptable and those who were not; some queers 
were clearly better than others.20 In the post September 11 production of stories of 
national identity, it is the queers who most closely conformed to the images of heroes 
who were the 'good' queers. 
These types of analyses use the idea of nations as imagined political 
communitiesz' told in stories that proliferate at times of national crisis. Nations are 
imagined because no member can ever know all of those who make up the nation, 
and therefore each carries a fictional image or story of the nation, and are imagined 
communities in the sense that all members of the nation are imagined as part of this 
fiction.22 AS imagined political communities, nations are the stories that are told 
about collective political i d e n t i i i e ~ . ~ ~  These stories of collective identities produce 
identities that are acceptable and even heroic within the community, and also 
typically mask various forms of inequality, exclusion and e~ploitation.'~ The inclusion 
of some identities occurs at the expense of the exclusion of others, and identifying 
particular national identities serves to repress other possibilities for both national and 
individual identities, as well as collective and individual differences within the 
'' lbid, at 69-70. 
20 
21 
Ibid. at 71. 
Anderson. B, Imagined Communities: Reflections of the Origins and Spread of Nationalism 
(London, Verso, 1991). The nation is also imagined as a sovereign state, territorially limited, 
internally united and free of interference from other nation-states. 
22 lbid. 
23 lbid, at 6; Stychin, C, A Nation by Rights (Philadelphia, 'Temple University Press, 1998) 1; 
Bhaba, H, 'Introduction: narrating the nation' in H Bhaba (ed), Nation and Narration 
(Routledge, London, 1990) at 1; See Harris, AP, 'Comment: Seductions of Modern Culture' 
(1996) 8 Yale Journal of Law and Humanities 213 at 213 (the philosophy of the Enlightenment 
and the Romantic opposition 'shape not only the stories we tell about our individual identities, 
but also the stories we tell about collective identities'). 
24~nderson.  21, at 7. 
nation." Stories of national identity may also produce internal and external enemies 
to the nation, and may shift over time, or spring up in response to major events, such 
as the September 11 bombings. 
Questions of the boundaries of nations, and internal and external 
demarcation, intersect with analyses of domestic law and domestication in lesbian 
and gay lives. Domestic laws are the laws internal to a sovereign state, including its 
immigration law. The domestic sphere is typically thought of as the home, or the 
private sphere, traditionally thought of as a place where the law does not intrude. 
The domestic sphere can be a place for domination along gender lines. Feminists 
and other critical scholars have critiqued the publiclprivate distinction, the supposedly 
natural gendering of the two spheres along a malelfernale divide, and the idea that 
the law does not intrude into the home.= in critical theory domestication may also 
mean relegation to the domestic sphere, or more generally bringing one group of 
people under the power or control of another, or the internalisation of the views of the 
dominant culture as 'common sense'." Using these analyses gays and lesbians 
might be said to be domesticated when they conform to heteronormative ideas about 
relationships, such as engaging in long term monogamous relationships in which 
they live or aspire to a middle class lifestyle, and in which they perform their sexuality 
only or mainly in the private, domestic realm of the household.28 Katherine Franke 
argues that the United States Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v   ex as" has 
domesticated sexual liberty, creating a legal landscape that is likely to render 
Davies. M, Delimiting the Law: 'Postmodernism' and the Politics of Law (Pluto Press, 
London. 1996) at 74. 
See Davies, n 8, at 186-172; Boyd, S (ed), Challenging the PublicPrivate Divide: 
Feminism, Law 8 Public Policy (Toronto, University of Toronto press, 1997); Thomton, M 
ed). Public and Private: Feminist Legal Debates (Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 1995). 
L Robson, R, 'Mother: The Legal Domestication of Lesbian Existence' (1992) 7 Hypafia 172 
at 172. 
Riggs, DW, 'Reassessing the Foster-Care System: Examining the Impact of Heterosexism 
on Lesbian and Gay Applicants' (2007) 22 Hypatia 132 at 134. 
123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). 
'different legal treatment to those who express their sexuality in domesticated ways 
and those who don't - regardless of ~rientation.'~' 
Using the idea of nations as stories told about national identity. I have argued 
that the recognition of lesbian and gay relationships in the parliamentary debates on 
the Civil Union Act 2004 (CUA) in New Zealand shifts the heterosexual/homosexual 
divide to include those same-sex partners willing to embrace heteronormative models 
of re~ationships.~' The stories of national identity told in these debates are in part 
stories of the progressive (partial) recognition of human rights in a nation moving to 
realise the promise of modernity, equal treatment of the law. Both those for and 
against recognition of same sex relationships told stories of New Zealanders as 
tolerant and fair, as forwarding-looking progressives who value stable long-term, 
committed relationships, warm loving communities for children, and strong families 
and family relationships. To the extent that lesbian and gay relationships can fit into 
these moulds, these are stories of the homonormatising of lesbian and gay 
relationships through (partial) inclusion in the collective identity of the nation. In the 
process of normalising these relationships, the family is reinscribed as the 
cornerstone of society, and the position of marriage as the 'gold standard' of 
relationships is reinfor~ed.~' 
IMMIGRATION POLICY IN NEW ZEALAND: 
FROM 'WHITER THAN WHITE' TO TIGHTENING AND WHITENING 
lmmigration and national identity are closely linked. Immigration is domestic law that 
determines who may enter into the nation, policing the boundaries of the nation. 
National identity is literally embodied in those who enter the country. Some are 
30 Franke. K, 'The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v Texas' (2004) 104 Columbia Law 
Review 1399 at 1416. 
Seuffert, S, 'Sexual Citizenship and the Civil Union Act 2004' (2006) 37 Victoria University 
of Wellington Law Review 281. 
32 Ibid, at 283; Young. n 12. at 230-235 (arguing that demands by gay rights groups for 
marriage rather than registered domestic partnerships reinforced the symbolic importance of 
marriage as a 'gold standard'.) 
easily absorbed into the dominant stories of national identity, while others represent 
the boundary of that identity.33 I have identified two trends in New Zealand's 
immigration law and policy since September 11; its 'whitening and tightening', and 
the opening of borders to those in same sex lesbian and gay relationships. A brief 
discussion of immigration and New Zealand's national identity is necessary to my 
analysis of the convergence of these trends. 
New Zealand's immigration policy historically focussed on creating a 'better 
Britain', a homogenous white settler society. This policy has been labelled 'whiter 
than white' to indicate that it was even more restrictive than Australia's 'white only' 
The informal and unwritten policy, in which government officials had far- 
reaching discretion, was implemented through tactics such as informing shipping 
companies confidentially of the types of people who would not be granted an entry 
permit upon arrival in the country.35 Other tactics included 'secrecy, a public 
avoidance of the issue of discrimination and, if necessary, a denial of its ex i~tence. '~~ 
Even during a shortage of labour from the 1940s to the late 1960s, immigration policy 
was broadened only reluctantly to include immigrants from Northern Europe; 
'Southern and Eastern Europeans were not considered to offer the same potential 
[for assimilation], and the possibility of non-European migration was dismissed out of 
New Zealand managed to maintain its unwritten discriminatory immigration 
policy longer than North America and Australia. In part this was the result of the 
widely held perception that New Zealand had harmonious relations with Maori and an 
33 Seuffert, N, Jurisprudence of National Identity (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2006) at 11 7. 
34 McKinnon, M, Immigrants and Citizens: New Zealanders and Asian lmmigration in 
Historical Context (Wellington. Victoria University Institute of Policy Studies. 1996) at 1. 12, 
22; Brooking, T and Rabel, R, 'Neither British Nor Polynesian: A Brief History of New 
Zealand's Other Immigrants' in S Grief (ed), lmmigration and National Identity in New Zealand 
(Palmerston North, Dunmore, 1995) at 23. 
Brawley, S, "'No 'White Policy' in New Zealand": Fact and Fiction in New Zealand's Asian 
Immigration record, 1946-1978' (April 1993) 27 NewZealand Journal of History 16 at 18-19. 
36 lbid, at 20. 
37 Brooking, n 34, at 38-39. 
egalitarian society. In fact, colonisation of indigenous people in New Zealand was 
perpetrated with many of the tactics used by the British government elsewhere, and 
'relations with Maori' were often fraught as a result. Although New Zealand at times 
embraced more socialist style politics and policies than some other liberal 
democracies, these were also raced and gendered, tending to disproportionately 
benefit white men and nuclear families. Nevertheless, it was difficult for the white 
international community to believe New Zealand discriminated in immigration along 
racial lines.38 As a result New Zealand's settler population developed into a 
particularly homogenous white society, which underpinned national identities such as 
'better Britain'. 
This 'whiter than white' policy persisted in different forms, with only minor 
exceptions when labourers were needed, until 1986.39 It was dropped in favour of 
policies specifically intended to align immigration with New Zealand's whirlwind 
implementation of radical neo-liberal economic policy, and a corresponding shift in 
national identity from a caring welfare society to an enterprise society.40 The new 
laws and policies resulted in more diversity in immigration, and a group of countries 
including China, India and South Korea, identified as 'Asia' became the leading 
source of immigrants. The proportion of immigration approvals granted to 'Asians' 
between 1991 and 1994 grew dramatically to 54.2 per cent of the total. In the years 
between the 1986 and 1996 census the number of people from Asian and Southeast 
Asian countries more than tripled, from 48,855 to 160,683. While the population 
percentage of Asians also more than tripled from 1.45 per cent in 1986 to 4.45 per 
cent in 1996, the numbers and percentage were still small?' 
38 Brawley. n 35, at 29. 
Seuffert, n 33, at 49-70, 117-132. 
40 Burke, Hon K. 'Review of Immigration Policy 1986' (Wellington. Government Printer, 1986) 
at 15-16, 19-21; McKinnon, n 34, at 42; Kasper. W, 'Populate or Languish? Rethinking New 
Zealand's Immigration Policy' (Auckland, New Zealand Business Roundtable. 1990); for an 
analysis of New Zealand's shift in national identity see Seuffert, n 33. at 71-84. 
41 Statistics New Zealand. '1996 Census of Populations and Dwellings: Ethnic Groups' 
(Wellington, 1996) Table l a .  
In the increasing panic post-September 11 the New Zealand government 
implemented successive changes to immigration criteria, tightening and whitening it 
over several years. One change came in November of 2002, significantly increasing 
the English language requirements for those not from English language backgrounds 
only.4z In 2003 there was a switch from the old general skills category, where 
approval was granted to immigrants who met the required number of points, to a new 
skilled migrant category, with more emphasis on job offers and criteria that allow 
more bureaucratic d i~c re t ion .~~  As a result of these two changes applications in the 
general skillslskilled migrant categories declined in the year ending in mid-2004, and 
the total approved applications fell almost 6,000 short of the target.44 The United 
Kingdom replaced lndia and China as the largest source of migrants.45 echoing pre- 
1986 'whiter than white' policies. This trend snowballed between 2003 and 2005, 
with approvals of residency applications from the United Kingdom increasing from 
14% of the total in the year ending June 2003,to 21% in the year ending June 2004, 
to 31% in the year ending June 2005.46 In the same period approvals from China 
decreased from 16% to 10% and approvals from lndia decreased from 16% to 7%.47 
lmmigration application approvals from lndia, China and South Korea combined 
dropped from 37% to 21% while thosefrom the United Kingdom increased from 14% 
to 31% in the same period, and the United States began to feature statistically in 
2005 with 3%.48 These figures dramatically illustrate the tightening and whitening of 
immigration policy in New Zealand. 
42 New Zealand Department of Labour, 'Trends in Residence Approvals 200212003' 
QVellington. Sept 2003) at 50-51. 
New Zealand Immigration Service, 'Operation Manual: Residence' (Wellington, Department 
of Labour, 2005) at chapter 84-3, para SM3.15-3.25. 
" New Zealand Department of Labour, 'Migration Trends 200312004' (Wellington, Immigration 
Service, Immigration Research Programme, 2004) at 1. 
45 /bid, at 1. 
4%epartment of Labour, 'Immigration Trends 200412009' (Wellington, December 2005) at 18. " Ibid, at 18. 
48 /bid, at 18. 
SAME SEX IMMIGRATION: 
A STORY OF PROGRESSIVE MODERNITY? 
During the same period in which immigration law and policy has been whitened and 
tightened, a story of legal recognition within New Zealand, and the relaxing of 
national boundaries into the country, can be told in relation to sexual minorities, and 
in particular, same sex couples. It is sometimes told as a story of progressive 
modernity. The familiar idea is that liberal states, over time, take steps to recognise, 
and confer rights on, more and more marginalised groups, making progress towards 
full equality. It is a story in which legal recognition of same sex relationships in civil 
unions in New Zealand, and legal equality with married and de facto couples in most 
other areas, including immigration, at least on one telling, has been achieved with 
surprising rapidity subsequent to the challenge to the exclusion of lesbians and gay 
men from marriage on the grounds of discrimination in 1996. This story has parallels 
in the United Kingdom and Canada. In Canada, once courts began to recognise 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation under the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms in 1995, the legal system's embrasure of non-nomlative 
spousal relationships, and the right to marry, occurred with 'startling rapidity.' 49 The 
Civil Marriage Act, legalising civil same sex marriage across Canada, was passed on 
20 July 2005.50 In the United Kingdom, same sex relationships were recognised with 
civil partnerships in the Civil Partnership Act 2004, which became 'effective on 5 
December 2005, and immigration was liberalised at the same time. Each of these 
developments have their own trajectory of human rights struggles, the funnelling and 
construction of political claims into socially acceptable paths and categories, critiques 
of assimilation and, in New Zealand and the UK, failure to provide full legal equality.51 
49 
-~ Young, n 12, at 216, 
50 Ibid. at 216. 
51 See Seuffert, n 33; Auchmuty. R, 'Same-sex Marflage Revived: Feminist Critique and Legal 
Strategy' (2004) 14 Feminism & Psychology 101. 
Nevertheless, they represent significant shifts in legal recognition of same sex 
relationships. 
This move towards legal recognition of relationships is reflected in 
immigration law in New Zealand. The Human Rights Act 1993 (HRA) recognised 
sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discriminati~n.~~ In 1993 the lmmigration 
Act 1987 (IA) gave 'enormous discretion' to the Minister of lmmigration and 
immigration The policy promulgated under the IA provided that the criteria 
for immigration of de facto partners in heterosexual relationships with New Zealand 
citizens or residents included that the couple had been 'living together in a genuine 
and stable relationship for 2 or more years.'54 The same criteria applied to those in 
same sex relationships with New Zealand citizens or residents, except that the 
relationships had to be '4 years or more' rather than 2 years or more.55 It was argued 
in 1994 that this discrepancy constituted discrimination on the basis of sexual 
or ientat i~n.~~ However, whether the prohibition on discrimination applied to 
immigration law and policy in 1994 was an open question, in part because the HRA 
prohibitions did not override other legislation until the end of 1 9 9 9 . ~ ~  Not surprisingly 
then, in December 1998 Cabinet decided to amend the Government Residence 
Policy to treat same sex couples the same as de facto couples under family 
immigration policy, and this change was made in 1999.~' However, de facto couples 
were still treated differently to married couples, and heterosexual couples had the 
choice of marriage while same sex couples did not. 
52 Human Rights Act 1993 (NZ), S 21(1); see Chauvel, C, 'New Zealand's Unlawful 
Immigration Policy' (1994) 4 Australasian Gay and Lesbian Law Journal 73 at 75. 
53 Stewart, B, 'New Zealand Immigration Law and Gay and Lesbian Couples' (1993) 3 
Australasian Gay and Lesbian Journal 30 at 33. 
54 Department of Labour (NZ), 'New Zealand lmmigration Instructions' (Wellington: 1991) Ch 
7-F-16; the Immigration Act 1987 S 2(1). 131. 
55 lbid, at Ch 7-F-16. 
56 Chauvel, n 52. 
57 \bid, at 79. 
56 Ministry of Justice (NZ), 'Same-Sex Couples and the Law: Backgrounding the Issues' 
(Wellington, 1999) 19, available at http://ww.justice.govt.nz/pubs/reportsll999 (last 
accessed 1 Nov 2007). 
In 2003, just after the English language requirement was significantly 
increased for those emigrating from non-English speaking countries, a 'Partnership 
policy' was introduced that aimed to treat those married and those in an 
'interdependent partnership akin to marriage', whether opposite sex or same sex 
couples, on the same basis when applying for residency." With the passage of the 
Civil Union Act 2004 and the accompanying Relationships (Statufory References) Act 
2005 the IA and lmmigration Regulations 1999 were further amended to implement 
the current 'Partnership policy' aligning civil unions with marriages, whether of the 
same or opposite sex couples." This trajectory appears to present a story of 
progressive modernity. However, as I argue below, aligning the criteria for same sex 
couples with the existing criteria for heterosexual couples without amending or 
reshaping the criteria in any way ensures that homonormatised and domesticated 
same sex couples, those properly raced and classed, who have mirrored 
heteronormatised relationships, will benefit disproportionately from the changes. 
SAME SEX IMMIGRATION: THE NUTS AND BOLTS 
lmmigration law and policy relevant to entry for same sex couples and same sex 
partners of New Zealand citizens and residents is contained in the lrnmigration Act 
1987 (IA), the lmmigration Regulations 1999 and the New Zealand lmmigration 
Service Operational Man~al .~ '  The IA provides that grants of residence and other 
permits and visas are matters of discretion for the Minister of lmmigration (Minister), 
and the Minister has broad powen to delegate under the IA to any immigration or 
visa officer." The Minister certifies policy that is then set out in the Operational 
59 Immigration Amendment Regulations (No 3) 2003 (NZ), amending Regulation 20 of the 
lmmigration Regulations l999 (NZ), effective 29 Sept 2003 to 7 April 2005. 
Relationships (Statutory References) Act 2005(NZ), S 7, Schedule 1; S 12, Schedule 4. 
61 New Zealand Immigration Service, Operational Manual (30 July 2007) available at 
htt~:llwww.immisration.aovt.nzlnzis (last accessed 1 Nov 2007). 
1mmigrationAct 1987(NZ), S 2, 8-10A, 13(A), 131. 
Manual, which is required to be published and available to the public.63 However, 
many of the applicable provisions in the Operational Manual require the satisfaction 
of a visa or immigration officer that the criteria are met; the burden of proving that the 
criteria are met is on the applicant and the partner.64 Clearly, the 'enormous 
discretion' of immigration officers referred to in 1993 still exists. 
The 'Partnership policy' provides entry for partners of New Zealand citizens 
and residents, and for partners of principal applicants in other categories. Under this 
policy couples must provide evidence to satisfy an immigration officer that they have 
been living together for l 2  months or more in a partnership that is genuine and 
stable.65 The criteria for immigration are therefore a partnership that must be 
'genuine and stable'. 
'Partnership' is defined as a legal marriage, a civil union (whether opposite or 
same sex), or a de facto relationship (whether opposite or same sex), and 'partner' is 
defined as one of the parties to one of these relati~nships.~"n New Zealand 
marriage is between opposite sex partners only.67 The term civil union is not defined 
for purposes of immigration. However, the Civil Union Act 2004 (CUA) provides 
reference to a civil union entered into in accordance with the CUA, and includes 
relationships entered into overseas recognised by regulations under the CUA.~' AS 
of this writing, the regulations identify only five overseas relationships recognised as 
civil unions: Finland's registered partnerships; the United Kingdom's civil 
partnerships; Germany's life partnerships; New Jersey's domestic partnerships; and 
Vermont's civil unions.69 Civil unions therefore include only those relationships 
entered into under the CUA or relationships legally recognised in one of these other 
63 Immigration Act 1987'(~~),  S 13A. 
New Zealand Immigration Service, n 61, at ch. 69. F2.5~. 
65 lbid, at ch 69. F2.5a. 
lbid, at ch 69, F2.5b 
67 Quilter v Attorney-General [l9981 1 NZLR 523 (CA). New Zealand does not recognise 
overseas same sex marriages. 
Civil Union Act 2004 (NZ), S 5. 
69 Civil Unions (Recognised Overseas Relationships) Regulations 2005, SR 20051125, S 3. 
five jurisdictions. Same sex couples who have legally recognised relationships in 
other jurisdictions, including those married in jurisdictions such as Canada that allow 
same sex marriages, or those whose relationships have been recognised in various 
ways in ~ndia,~' have to come into New Zealand under the de facto relationship 
category. 
'De facto relationship', which was added to the regulations in 2005, is not 
defined in the IA or regulations; it is defined in the lnterpretation Act 1999 to mean a 
relationship between two people, whether the same or opposite sex, who live 
together as a couple in a relationship in the nature of marriage or civil ~ n i o n . ~ '  While 
there does not seem to be any definitive authority on this point, the lnterpretation Act 
1999 may import the further criteria of 'living together as a couple' and 'in a 
relationship in the nature of marriage' into the immigration regulation interpretation of 
partnership. These terms may be interpreted differently from the regulation 
requirement of a genuine and stable partnership. This result would be unfortunate, 
and probably discriminatory, as it could result in different criteria and treatment for, 
for example, same and opposite sex couples married in Canada. 
A partnership is considered to be genuine and stable it if it has been entered 
into with the intention of being maintained on a long-term exclusive basis and is likely 
to endure." Factors that have a bearing on whether the two people are living 
together in a partnership that is genuine and stable include the duration of the 
relationship, the existence, nature and extent of the partners' common residence, the 
degree of financial dependence or interdependence, the common ownership, use 
and acquisition of property, the degree of commitment of the partners to a shared life, 
children, the pelformance of common household duties by the partners, and the 
'O Vanita, R. Love's Rite: Same Sex Marriage in India and the West (Gordonsville, VA, 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2005). 
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reputation and public aspects of the re~ationship.~~ Evidence that the partners are 
living together may include documents showing shared accommodation such as joint 
ownership of residential property, joint tenancy agreements, and correspondence 
addressed to both of the partners at the same address.74 Evidence that the 
partnership is genuine and stable may include a marriage certificate, a civil union 
certificate, birth certificates of children, evidence of communication between the 
partners, photographs of the parties together, documents indicating public 
recognition of the partnership and other evidence that the parties are committed to 
each other emotionally and exclusively.75 This final type of evidence of exclusive 
emotional commitment may include evidence of joint decision making and plans 
together, sharing of parental obligations, sharing of household activities, 
companionship and spare time, leisure and social activities and presentation to 
outsiders as a 
New Zealand's alignment of immigration criteria for same sex couples with 
those of opposite sex couples makes it one of the most 'gay friendly' countries for 
immigration. Ad hoc reports from (middle class, white) New Zealanders with partners 
immigrating to the country suggest that the criteria are often sensitively and fairly 
applied. Nevertheless, in the next section I want to trouble this progressive narrative 
. , 
of formal equality using the ideas of homomornativity and domestication that I have 
discussed. 
HOMONORMATIVIN AND DOMESTICATION 
The border control function involves making determinations about the embodiment of 
national identity, producing both national and individual identities in the process. The 
immigration law and policy criteria, and the implementation of the criteria, determine 
73 lbid, at ch 69, F2.20b. 
74 Ibid. at ch 69, F2.20.15a. 
75 lbid, at ch 69, F2.20.15~. 
'' lbid, at ch 69, F2.20.15~. 
who will be included in and who will be excluded from the nation. The criteria for 
inclusion tell stories of New Zealand's aspirations for national identity, for its 
imagined political community. These stories may be multiple, shifting, and even 
contradictory. Those admitted may be differently positioned in the stories. 
buttressing certain stories by inclusion or by contrast. Further, the implementation of 
immigration law and policy produces subjects through regulation: 
m o  become subject to regulation is also to become subjectivated by it, that 
is, to be brought into being as a subject precisely through being regulated.77 
The subject is literally brought into the nation through regulation, producing an 
identity through the performance of meeting the criteria to the satisfaction of the 
officials. 
In this section I want to make two points about the regulatory process for 
same sex immigration in New Zealand. First, I want to consider the dynamics of 
opening the country's borders to lesbian and gay couples while simultaneously 
tightening and whitening immigration policy. Second, I want to consider the 
implications of including same sex couples in the category of de facto and aligning 
that category with the categories of marriage and civil union, so that the criteria 
applied to same sex couples is the criteria developed to determine which 
heterosexual couples ought to be included in the natiom7' I want to analyse the 
heteronormativity and hom~normativity~~ of the criteria. Heteronormativity includes 
the norms of heterosexuality as well as the failure to recognise any differences in 
same sex relationships. Following on from the discussion earlier in the chapter, 
homonormativity includes depoliticisation as well as domesticity and privatisation It 
includes the ways in which entry into the area of domestic law requires proof of 
n Butler, J, Undoing Gender (New York, Routledge, 2004) at 41 
78 See Lenon. n 13. at 408. 
79 See Duggan, n 1, at 179 
domesticity, or taming, and the relegation of sexual identity and practices to the 
private realm. 
The implications of aligning criteria for immigration of same sex couples to 
existing criteria for heterosexual couples foregrounds sexuality as the only difference 
that is recognised. Lesbian and gay couples have to prove to the satisfaction of 
immigration officers that they are just like the types of heterosexual couples who 
meet the criteria except for their sexuality; 'an intelligible legal subject is produced 
solely against heterosexuality and hence, is "just gay.""' This binary approach to 
difference fails to address other possible differences, such as class, gender and race. 
The result is likely to be that those lesbians and gay men admitted to the country will 
differ from heterosexual couples admitted only in their sexuality; they will tend to be 
privileged along in race, class and gender, and that privilege will be occluded in part 
by the focus on sexuality." To the extent that the criteria privilege middle class white 
men, then middle class white gay men will be privileged by this approach to same 
sex immigrati~n.~' As discussed above. New Zealand's historical 'whiter than white' 
immigration policy has been reinscribed in the recent tightening and whitening of 
immigration law and policy. The new, more stringent English language requirements 
were adopted about the same time as the same sex immigration criteria were 
opened. The language requirements apply to the partnership policy, and each 
partner must separately meet the ~riteria.'~ These criteria are likely to ensure that 
same sex immigration approvals are aligned withthe overall trend, discussed above, 
of favouring those from English speaking, predominantly white, countries. 
As discussed above, the CUA regulations recognise only five types of 
overseas same sex relationships as civil unions: Finland's registered partnerships; 
Lenon. n 13, at 408. 
'' Crenshaw, K, 'Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics and Violence Against 
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the United Kingdom's civil partnerships; Germany's life partnerships; New Jersey's 
domestic partnerships; and Vermont's civil unions. All five of these are developed 
countries that are predominantly white. This means that same sex couples from 
other countries, even where they have a legally recognised relationship, will be in the 
de facto relationship category, and may therefore have to meet a different, and 
potentially more stringent, criteria. Interestingly, in the United Kingdom, the legally 
recognised relationships in 25 overseas countries and states in the United States will 
be recognised as civil partnerships in a non-exhaustive list.84 With one possible 
exception, this is also a list of developed, predominantly white c o u n t r i e ~ . ~ ~  Further, 
the website of the UK Gay and Lesbian Immigration Group notes that the most 
common reason given for refusal in the proposed civil partner category is that the 
relationship is not genuine, and this is particularly true where the foreign applicant is 
from a developing ~ountry.~"nfortunately, this type of information is not available 
for New Zealand. However, the short New Zealand list of recognised relationships, 
combined with the possibility of different criteria for de facto relationships, and the UK 
experience, suggest that this is an area for concern, and that it may well be more 
difficult for those lesbians and gay men from developing countries to migrate. 
Combined with the alignment of criteria for same sex immigration with that of 
heterosexuals, which I will discuss next, this analysis suggests that the idea of a 
'national heterosexuality' that is sanitised and deracialised (white) may fit here." 
The existing criteria embrace heteronormativity, or norms of heterosexuality, 
and as a result tend to call for the production of homonormatised lesbian and gay 
84 UK Diplomatic Service Procedures. 'Entry Clearance' Volume 1 General Instructions, 
Schedule 20, A List of Recognised Overseas Same Sex Relationships, includes 24 overseas 
relationships including Massachusetts, Vermont and California. 
Mexiw is the exception. 
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identities aligned with heteronormativity. Heteronormativity includes norms about 
what relationships should look like. These norms may be submerged, and difficult to 
decontextua~ise,~~ they 'construct and continually reinforce (even if only in the 
background) our idea of "the norma~."'~' The immigration criteria requires proof of 
genuine and stable relationships that are entered into with the intention of 
continuation on a long-term exclusive basis and are likely to endure." These are 
criteria that embrace heterosexual norms: 
Living together, having joint finances, and publicly demonstrating an exclusive 
and committed bond, are criteria derived from dominant notions of what it 
means to be in a relationship, ... derived from the idealized model of a 
heterosexual relati~nship.~' 
Heteronormative models may also set the standard to which lesbian and gay 
couples have to perform their relationships, in producing a narrative, and therefore 
their identities, for immigration officials: 'I ... found it frustrating that in order to fulfil 
the requirements of my visa application [to Australia] it was implied that I should 
produce a narrative of my relationship with Nigel to show how "marriage-like" it is.'" 
Lesbian and gay couples who may be in long term relationships but 
consciously opt out of heteronormative relationship practices for political reasons, as 
a result of embracing feminist critiques of heterosexual norms, or for other  reason^,'^ 
may be less likely to gain entry to the country. For example, Sue Wilkinson and Celia 
Butler, n 77, at 41. 
Chambers. SA, 'Heteronormativity and the L Word' in K Akass and J McCabe (eds), 
Reading the L word: outing contemporary television (London, 1.B.Tauris. 2006) at 84. 
New Zealand Immigration Service, n 55, Section F2.10.1. 
Holt. M, 'Marriage-like' or Married? Lesbian and gay Marriage, Partnership and Migration' 
2004) 14 Feminism & Psychology 30 at 32. " Holt, n 90, at 33. 
93 ibid, at 33: 'lesbians and gay men have been among those challenging the idea that a 
commitment to another person necessarily entails sexual exclusivity, living together, or fixed 
gender roles for each partner.' 
Kitzinger have written of their relationship that they had both previously come out of 
long-term 'marriage-like' relationships and were committed, both personally and 
politically, to having a relationship with more autonomy, freedom and openness.94 
They found the idea of making an ostentatious ceremony of their private commitment 
embarrassing, and they did not want to promise each other 'unconditional love, 
lifelong commitment and sexual monogamy.'95 They chose not to live together; they 
had individual mortgages, separate houses, separate finances, were on different 
electoral roles, paid different utility bills and owned nothing in As a result 
of these choices, they note that they would not have met United Kingdom same sex 
immigration requirements of two years cohabitation or Canadian immigration 
requirements of one year of cohabiting in a conjugal relationship.97 Given the way 
they chose to structure their relationship, they may have had a struggle entering New 
Zealand even under its current gay friendly criteria. They would have been unlikely 
to have evidence to show that they had been living together for 12 months or more in 
a partnership that was genuine and stable, and nor would they be likely to satisfy the 
criteria that there 'were genuine and compelling reasons for any period of 
~eparation.'~' 
Wilkinson and Kitzinger's relationship may have been inspired by their 
politics, and in that sense they were politicised rather than depoliticised in Duggan's 
terms. Lesbians and gay men who live their politics in their relationships may 
therefore be less likely to be admitted under the immigration criteria, and those who 
are 'depoliticised', not questioning of heteronormative relationship models and happy 
to adopt them, may be more likely to meet the criteria for immigration. Those who 
chose to 'make a queer world' by engaging in 'kinds of intimacy that bear no 
- 
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necessary relation to domestic space, to kinship, to the couple form, to property, or to 
the nation' are less likely to be fit subjects for immigration." 
The reputation and public aspects of the relationship are also factors that 
indicate a genuine and stable relationship. To the extent that lesbians and gay men 
who live their politics in public are less likely to be accepted in mainstream society, or 
more likely to disrupt dominant notions of commitment, the reputational and public 
aspects of their relationships may count against them. The reputational aspects of 
the relationship may also be judged by the couple's reputation with extended family, 
and non-normative, political behaviour may also impact here. Those lesbian and gay 
couples whose families are not accepting of their relationships, who may also be less 
likely to be 'out' in other contexts, will also be disadvantaged by these criteria. 
Lesbians and gay men who are not 'out' for any reason, including that the 
countries in which they live are homophobic or persecute lesbians and gays, will be 
disadvantaged by all of the criteria as it will be more difficult to live with partners, own 
property with partners and establish a reputation or public aspects of the 
re~ationship.'~~ These people may have to resort to the refugee or asylum 
processes, which are time-consuming, costly, and may have erratic  result^.'^' 
Further, the treatment of lesbians and gay men in some countries may fall into a gap 
between persecution meeting the refugee criteria and difficulty living, or being out, 
without any specific state persecution. For example, in one refugee appeal the 
Refugee Status Appeal Authority (RSAA) accepted that the appellant, a 28 year old 
Nigerian man, would be shunned by his family and ostracised by his church, that his 
Berlant, n 83, at 558. 
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life would be far from ideal and that there was a climate of intolerance towards non- 
heterosexual relationships in his home co~ntry.'~' Nevertheless, refugee status was 
denied on the basis that, although homosexual acts are a criminal offence in Nigeria, 
there was no evidence of prosec~tions. '~~ If the RSAA assessment of homophobia 
and the law in Nigeria is correct, lesbian and gay couples living in Nigeria might be 
likely not be out to family and friends, and not live together and build up the indicia of 
a genuine and stable relationship required by the immigration criteria, making 
immigration as partners much more difficult, if not impossible. 
The basis of the criteria in the dominant heterosexual paradigm and norms 
also means that there is no recognition of the difficulties that may be associated with 
realising that one is a sexual minority. For example, a Fijian Muslim man aged 22 
originally came to New Zealand to marry a woman chosen by his family.lM It 
appears that about nine months later he fell out with his and his wife's family and 
made friends witha gay man, with whom he later entered into a relationship.lo5 At 
this time he continued to pursue immigration based on his marriage, and it was not 
until more than a year later that he told immigration authorities that he was in a same 
sex re~ationship.'~~ In considering whether the man was living in a stable and 
genuine relationship with his new partner, the Residence Review Board (RRB) stated 
that doubt arose as to whether the relationship was genuine due to the fact that the 
man continued to state that he was committed to his marriage and to trying to make it 
work after moving in with his same sex partner.'07 Not surprisingly, it was submitted 
on the appellant's behalf that 'at the time he was confused with his life and unsure 
where he was heading."08 There is nothing in the criteria that addresses, or provides 
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guidance to officials to respond to these types of situations. Indeed, the RRB 
decision confirming the denial of his residence application makes no attempt at all to 
place the man's actions in the context of homophobia; it appears to hold the fact that 
the man did not reveal his gay relationship earlier in the process against him.log 
Finally, the immigration criteria also embrace concepts of domesticity in a 
number of forms. Most obviously, factors such as the performance of household 
duties and evidence such as sharing parental obligations, household activities and 
joint decision making evoke images of domesticity as home, as .the realm gendered 
female. The fact that these criteria are integral to the determination of a genuine and 
stable relationship suggests that lesbians and gay men have to prove that they are 
domesticated along gendered, heterosexual lines. 
To the extent that the criteria are focused on economic criteria and ownership 
of property those with money and middle class domestic aspirations are privileged. 
The factors bearing on whether couples are living together in a genuine and stable 
partnership include the nature and extent of the common residence, the common 
ownership, use and acquisition of property and financial dependence or 
interdependence. Those who cannot afford to own property must prove joint tenancy 
agreements. 
The heteronormativity of the criteria as a whole overlaps with other aspects of 
domesticity; lesbians and gay men have to prove that they are 'just like' 
heterosexuals and that their sexuality is private and does not make any real 
difference. The assumption is that same sex couples set up house, own property 
together, participate in child raising and family gatherings, jointly communicate, 
socialise with their families and friends and generally live their lives just like 
heterosexuals. The reality that they are doing so in heteronormative, homophobic 
societies that may not recognise and validate their relationships, or that may treat 
them as second class, in the context of family reactions that may vary from 
'09 /bid, at 12-13. 
persecution to disassociation to mild disapproval, and that they may be struggling 
with their own sexual identities, is all rendered invisible by the criteria and 
determinations to be made. This is not to say that there are no immigration officials 
who understand heteronormativity or homophobia, and respond sensitively to the 
situations of lesbian and gay couples, but rather that the criteria mean that when that 
happens, those individuals will bring it to the process, rather than having that 
understanding integrally incorporated into the process. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter started with the identification of two recent trends in New Zealand's 
immigration law and policy: the general tightening and whitening post September 11, 
and the opening of the nation's boundaries to lesbian and gay partners. It has 
suggested that attention to the 'particularities of sexuality, race, class and gender in 
the immigration criteria for same sex partners reveals that these two trends are not 
as contradictory as they might at first appear. The lesbian andgay couples most 
likely to gain entry to the country easily are likely to be those homonormatised 
couples who are willing to adopt heterosexual models for their relationships, who do 
not politicise their sexuality, and who are properly domesticated. Those most likely to 
fit this model are likely to be from predominantly white liberal democracies, the very 
places targeted for immigration more generally post September 11. 
